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FOREWORD 
LITIGATING FEDERAL HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION 
AND THE INTERSTICES OF PROCEDURE 
Wendy Collins Perdue * 
On November 11, 2011, the University of Richmond Law Re-
view held its annual Allen Chair Symposium, focused on the liti-
gation challenges to the Patient Protection and Mfordable Care 
Act ("ACA"). Recognizing that much had already been written 
about the constitutionality of the ACA, but that less scholarly at-
tention had been focused on issues such as jurisdiction, standing, 
ripeness, and severability, the Symposium was entitled "Every-
thing but the Merits." The timing of this Symposium was both 
prescient and awkward. Three days after the Symposium was 
held, the Supreme Court took certiorari on a group of the ACA 
cases and scheduled an extraordinary three days of argument. Of 
course once the Court decides these cases, prognostications will 
be of little significance. Fortunately, the pieces that follow offer 
insights that go far beyond the issues of the ACA litigation, exam-
ining a range of issues about constitutional litigation. 
One of the major themes of these pieces is judicial restraint. 
Edward Hartnett and Tobias Dorsey consider judicial restraint 
from the perspective of the potential scope of a ruling on the mer-
its of the ACA. Hartnett examines the difference between facial 
and as-applied constitutional challenges and argues for the re-
straint inherent in the latter. He observes that facial challenges 
are a "winner-take-all" proposition and argues that courts are "in 
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author 
would like to thank the Allen family for their support of the Allen Chair Symposium along 
with Professors Carl Tobias and Kevin Walsh and Symposium Editor Aminah Qureshi for 
their work in putting together this excellent 2011 Allen Chair Symposium. 
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general better suited to adjudicating on as as-applied basis." He 
concluded that at least as to challenges to the individual mandate 
"the Court is being asked to articulate a principle for the first 
time, it is freer to capitalize on its comparative competence, and 
... render a decision that lowers the stakes rather than raises 
them." 
Tobias Dorsey looks at a different aspect of scope-the issue of 
severability-and offers the unique insight of a lawyer who 
worked for many years in the Office of Legislative Counsel of the 
House or Representatives. He argues that the Court should reject 
a test that purports to divine whether a particular piece of legis-
lation would have been enacted absent the provision that turns 
out to be unconstitutional. Having seen up close the legislative 
sausage being made, Dorsey argues that it is neither possible nor 
seemly for a court to determine what would have happened had 
one provision been different. As he explains: "A statute is not the 
result of a legislative bargain. A statute is the product of a con-
vergence of microbargains, between and among 100 Senators, 435 
Representatives, and the White House." The tradeoffs made are 
not only within a single bill but also ''between this bill and that 
hearing, and between this bill and that nomination." He con-
cludes that the issue of severability "should be treated like any 
other Article III judicial power-it should be used with restraint." 
"When the Court decides to strike part of a statute, it should 
strike as narrowly as possible." To do otherwise, Dorsey argues, is 
to allow the Court to act as the House of Lords and veto legisla-
tion wholesale. 
Christopher Bryant considers judicial restraint from a broader 
perspective and argues that upholding the constitutionality of the 
ACA would constitute "constitutional forbearance" that would 
''begin restoration of a distinction between constitutional law and 
partisan politics." This restoration is, according to Bryant "sorely 
needed and long overdue." Acknowledging that forbearance might 
not be appropriate in cases in which the ordinary political pro-
cesses are unreliable, he argues that this is not the case with the 
ACA. The most controversial of the law's provisions, the individu-
al mandate, applies to virtually every person in the country, so 
majoritarian political processes need not be displaced by Court 
intervention. While Bryant's article is not strictly "procedural" in 
its focus, it argues for an interpretative stance that has signifi-
cance beyond "the merits" of the ACA cases. 
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In contrast, Kevin Walsh would have the Court exercise re-
straint not by limiting the scope of its ruling or by adopting a par-
ticular interpretative stance, but by declining to decide the issue 
at this time. He focuses his analysis on the Anti-Injunction Act, 
explaining first how under that Act a constitutional challenge to 
the ACA is premature. He then situates such restraint in a 
broader context, arguing that "a decision not to decide could 
strengthen the Supreme Court, in a way, since its legitimacy de-
rives in part from its identity as a court of limited jurisdiction 
that resolves concrete cases." Thus, Bryant and Walsh offer two 
different visions of Supreme Court legitimacy-Bryant would 
have the Court prove its non-political stripes by deciding the case 
contrary to partisan expectations, and Walsh would have it apply 
jurisdictional doctrines in a precise and lawyerly way that would 
emphasize that the Courts' job "is not to decide about the validity 
of law considered in itself, but to decide on the obligations of per-
sons under the law." 
A second major theme of these pieces is the role of states both 
as litigant in challenges to the ACA and participants in the 
broader debates about health care reform. Stephen Vladeck's es-
say on state standing sounds some of the same themes as Hart-
nett, Dorsey, Bryant, and Walsh. Vladeck situates the Virginia 
litigation in the broader jurisprudence of state standing cases and 
concludes that the Fourth Circuit reached the right conclusion. 
However the essay goes beyond doctrinal analysis and argues 
that "state standing in such circumstances should be disfavored" 
because relaxed state standing rules "create a very real risk of 
converting the federal courts into councils of revision" and may 
"short-circuit the principal means through which majorities have 
traditionally exercised control over the scope of federal power-at 
the ballot box." 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard approaches the role of states from a 
different perspective, examining the rhetorical significance of fed-
eralism in the debates about the ACA. "States' rights" is not a 
new battle cry in debates over divisive issues of public policy and 
Leonard examines how this theme has developed both in the state 
response to the ACA and in the litigation challenging it. She 
notes that "[t]he issue of the proper scope of federal power vis-a-
vis states has become the central, signature issue of ACA opposi-
tion" and argues that rhetorical federalism "should not be disre-
garded simply as partisan sour grapes by Obamacare or Obama 
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opponents but instead should be considered valuable to the 
health care decision making process and state-federal relations." 
Robert Claiborne's comment offers a close examination of one 
state's legislative foray into the ACA and concludes that Virgin-
ia's Health Care Freedom Act should not be understood as a tra-
ditional state "nullification" effort. Unlike some state resolutions 
passed in the wake of Brown u. Board of Education, Virginia has 
not denied the legitimate authority of the Supreme Court to de-
cide the controversy. On the contrary, Virginia filed suit in feder-
al court. Claiborne argues that the Virginia legislation should be 
understood as an effort that respects Supreme Court and federal 
supremacy but that merely sought to give the state a seat at the 
table at which the constitutional discussion would occur. 
Finally, Bradley Joondeph offers "five questions" that succinct-
ly summarize many of the issues raised in the other pieces. His 
questions address issues of judicial displacement of the political 
process, the proper role of states in the health care system, 
whether Congress's powers to enact even more comprehensive 
health care reform implies the power to do less, the appearance of 
court entanglement with partisan politics, and judicial restraint. 
The questions he raises are ones that are likely to be relevant not 
only to the ACA litigation but to other critical public policy issues 
that end up, as so many do, in the courts. 
This Symposium issue focuses not on the scope of Congress's 
power under the Commerce Clause or the meaning of the Tenth 
Amendment: Instead it focuses on the doctrines and principles 
that shape constitutional adjudication in this and other cases. 
Henry Maine famously observed about the common law that "the 
substantive law [was] ... secreted in the interstices of proce-
dure."1 The same may prove to be true of the substantive consti-
tutional law principles at stake in the ACA litigation. 
1. HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOMS 389 (1883). 
